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Answering Moral Skepticism by Shelly Kagan

• Answering Moral Skepticism
• Shelly Kagan
• Page: 408
• Format: pdf, ePub, mobi, fb2
• ISBN: 9780197688984
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

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Most thoughtful people worry at one time or another about whether there can actually be such a thing as objective moral truth. They might wonder, for example, whether the prevalence of moral disagreement makes it reasonable to conclude that there aren't really any moral facts at all. Or they might be bothered by questions like these: What could objective moral facts possibly be like? Isn't it obvious that morality is simply relative to particular societies and particular times? If there were moral facts, how could we ever come to know anything about them? Can morality really have the motivating and rational force we normally take it to have? How can one possibly find a place for objective moral values in a scientific worldview? Some people are driven by questions like these to the conclusion that we should embrace skepticism about morality, denying the very existence of anything worthy of the name. In Answering Moral Skepticism, Shelly Kagan shows how those who accept the existence of objective moral truth can provide plausible answers to these questions. Focusing throughout on issues that trouble reflective individuals, Kagan provides an accessible defense of the belief in objective morality will be of interest to both students of metaethics as well as anyone worried about the objectivity of their own moral judgements.

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Answering Moral Skepticism, Shelly Kagan | 9780197688977
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Answering Moral Skepticism 電子書，作者Shelly Kagan
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Answering Moral Skepticism | Rent | 9780197688984
In Answering Moral Skepticism, Shelly Kagan shows how those who accept the existence of objective moral truth can provide plausible answers to these questions.
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